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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Did the trial court commit error by entering custody orders without 
the court conducting a best interest examination as is mandated in Utah Code §30-
3-10 through 30-3-10.2 and based upon the recommendation of the custody 
evaluator who did not comply with the Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-
903(5)? 
ISSUE PRESERVED AT TRIAL: The issue of the trial court committing 
error by not conducting a best interest test to determine custody or having the 
custody evaluator enter a recommendation without fully complying with Rule 4-903 of 
the Rules of Judicial Administration was preserved at trial by the trial court's 
admission that the court must examine certain factors to determine custody (R@ 
682, page 20 and 35). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In custody matters, appellate courts generally give 
the trial court considerable discretion, see Carsten v. Carsten. 2007 UTApp 174,fl3, 
164 P.3d 429, because the trial court's proximity to the evidence places it in a better 
4 
position than an appellate court to choose the best custody arrangement. See Shioii 
v. Shioii, 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985). That broad discretion, however, must be 
guided by the governing law adopted by the Utah Legislature, see Utah Code Ann. 
§30-3-10, -10.2. The Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation for 
correctness. See Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
ISSUE 2: Did the trial court commit error by entering findings and ordering 
the parties to exercise joint legal custody of the parties' minor child without the 
parties submitting a parenting plan and without the Court determining that joint legal 
custody was in the best interest of the minor child? 
ISSUE PRESERVED AT TRIAL: The issue of the trial court committing 
error by not entering a parenting plan with its order that the parties exercise joint 
legal custody, was preserved at trial with the trial court's acceptance of the custody 
evaluator recommendation (R@ 682, page 36 and 37) and Petitioner's concerns and 
rejection of such. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: In custody matters, appellate courts generally 
give the trial court considerable discretion, see Carson v. Carson. 2007 UT App 174, 
P3, 164 P.3d 429, because the trial courts proximity to the evidence places it in a 
better position than an appellate court to choose the best custody arrangement. See 
Shioii v. Shioii. 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985). That broad discretion must be 
guided by the governing law adopted by the Utah legislature, see Utah Code Ann. 
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§30-3-10.2. The appellate court reviews questions of statutory interpretation for 
correctness, see Wells v. Wells, 841 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
ISSUE 3: Did the trial court commit error by entering amended findings and 
an amended decree that were inconsistent and created confusion regarding parent 
time of the minor child's overnights with each parent? Does this issue intertwine with 
the problem of there being no joint legal custody parenting plan submitted by the 
parties or demanded by the court? 
ISSUE PRESERVED AT TRIAL: The issue of the trial court committing 
error by entering conflicting orders of parent time was preserved at trial when the 
court dealt with the recommendation of the custody evaluator and Petitioner rejected 
the recommendation (R@ 682, page 36 and 37). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In custody matters, appellate courts generally give 
the trial court considerable discretion, see Carson v. Carson. 2007 UT App 174, P3, 
164 P.3d 429, because the trial courts proximity to the evidence places it in a better 
position than an appellate court to choose the best custody arrangement. See Shioii 
v- Shioii, 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985). While the trial court's findings of fact in 
divorce appeals are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous standard", its conclusions 
of law "are reviewed for correctness and given no special deference on appeal". 
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209,1211, (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
ISSUE 4: Did the trial court commit error in its determination that neither 
party was awarded alimony from the other, either now or in the future? 
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ISSUED PRESERVED AT TRIAL: The issue of the trial court forever 
barring alimony either now or in the future was preserved at trial when the trial court 
took the alimony issue under advisement and entered a ruling five days after trial 
(R@ 440-441) and Petitioner later filed her Motion for Reconsideration regarding the 
alimony ruling (R@ 480-501). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: While the trial court's findings of fact in divorce 
appeals are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous standard", its conclusions of law 
"are reviewed for correctness and given no special deference on appeal". Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211, (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
ISSUE 5: Did the trial court commit error in its determinations that JoAnn 
was to receive no alimony from Glen because she had no need and because Glen's 
ability to pay had not been calculated? 
ISSUES PRESERVED AT TRIAL: The issue of the trial court not ordering 
that Respondent pay any alimony to Petitioner because Petitioner had no need for 
alimony was preserved at trial when the trial court took the alimony issue under 
advisement and entered a ruling after trial (R@ 440-441) and Petitioner later filed 
her Motion for Reconsideration (R@ 490-501). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: While the trial court's findings of fact in divorce 
appeals are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous standard", its conclusions of law 
"are reviewed for correctness and given no special deference on appeal". Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211, (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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ISSUE 6: Did the trial court commit error by declining to take into account in 
its alimony determination JoAnn's request to have Glen pay post-divorce savings 
and/or retirement monies to her? 
ISSUES PRESERVED AT TRIAL: The issue of the trial court not 
considering Petitioner's claim to include retirement needs as part of her claim for 
alimony was preserved at trial when the trial court took the alimony issue under 
advisement and entered a ruling after trial (R@ 440-441) and Petitioner later filed 
her Motion for Reconsideration (R@ 490-501). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Trial courts have considerable discretion in 
determining alimony and property distribution in divorce cases, and will be upheld on 
appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Howell v. 
Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 211 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In exercising its discretion, 
however, the trial court must make explicit findings of fact in support of its legal 
conclusions. Montova v. Montova. 696 P.2d 1193,1194 (Utah 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. 30-3-5(8)(a-e) 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
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(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the 
payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor 
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the 
payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, 
in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of 
trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or born 
during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that 
change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the 
amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced 
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through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 30-3-10(1 )(a)(i-iv) 
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children are separated, or their marriage is 
declared void or dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future care and 
custody of the minor children as it considers appropriate. 
(a) In determining any form of custody, the court shall consider the best interests 
of the child and, among other factors the court finds relevant, the following: 
(i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties; 
(ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the child, including 
allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent; 
(iii) the extent of bonding between the parent and child, meaning the depth, 
quality, and nature of the relationship between a parent and child; and 
(iv) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.2. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 30-3-10.2(1 )-(2) 
(1) The court may order joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both if one 
or both parents have filed a parenting plan in accordance with Section 30-3-10.8 and 
it determines that joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both is in the best 
interest of the child. 
(2) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by ordering 
joint legal or physical custody, the court shall consider the following factors: 
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(a) whether the physical, psychological, and emotional needs and development of 
the child will benefit from joint legal or physical custody; 
(b) the ability of the parents to give first priority to the welfare of the child and 
reach shared decisions in the child's best interest; 
(c) whether each parent is capable of encouraging and accepting a positive 
relationship between the child and the other parent, including the sharing of love, 
affection, and contact between the child and the other parent; 
(d) whether both parents participated in raising the child before the divorce; 
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of the parents; 
(f) the preference of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to 
reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to joint legal or physical custody; 
(g) the maturity of the parents and their willingness and ability to protect the child 
from conflict that may arise between the parents; 
(h) the past and present ability of the parents to cooperate with each other and 
make decisions jointly; 
(i) any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, or kidnapping; and 
(j) any other factors the court finds relevant. 
RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: 4-903(5) 
(5) The purpose of the custody evaluation will be to provide the court with 
information it can use to make decisions regarding custody and parenting time 
arrangements that are in the child's best interest. This is accomplished by assessing 
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the prospective custodians' capacity to parent, the developmental, emotional, and 
physical needs of the child, and the fit between each prospective custodian and 
child. Unless otherwise specified in the order, evaluators must consider and respond 
to each of the following factors: 
(5)(A) the child's preference; 
(5)(B) the benefit of keeping siblings together; 
(5)(C) the relative strength of the child's bond with one or both of the prospective 
custodians; 
(5)(D) the general interest in continuing previously determined custody 
arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted; 
(5)(E) factors relating to the prospective custodians' character or status or their 
capacity or willingness to function as parents, including: 
(5)(E)(i) moral character and emotional stability; 
(5)(E)(ii) duration and depth of desire for custody; 
(5)(E)(iii) ability to provide personal rather than surrogate care; 
(5)(E)(iv) significant impairment of ability to function as a parent through drug abuse, 
excessive drinking or other causes; 
(5)(E)(v) reasons for having relinquished custody in the past; 
(5)(E)(vi) religious compatibility with the child; 
(5)(E)(vii) kinship, including in extraordinary circumstances stepparent status; 
(5)(E)(viii) financial condition; and 
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(5)(E)(ix) evidence of abuse of the subject child, another child, or spouse; and 
(5)(F) any other factors deemed important by the evaluator, the parties, or the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner, JoAnn Sellers, hereinafter "JoAnn", separated and filed for divorce 
against Respondent, Glen Sellers, hereinafter "Glen", on or about April 9, 2005. 
JoAnn and Glen were married on March 20, 1981. They had been married for 
twenty-four (24) years at the time of the divorce filing. There were three (3) children 
born as issue of the marriage, one of whom was a minor of fourteen (14) years of 
age when the matter came on for trial on February 20, 2008. 
At the time of separation, JoAnn was employed by Granite School District and 
had gross monthly income of $1,824. At the time of trial the Court found that 
JoAnn's W-2 for 2007 indicated that her gross monthly income was $4,031.82. At 
the time of trial the Court found Glen's gross monthly income to be $7,920.33 or 
$95,044 annualized based on his 2007 W-2 tax documents. 
After trial, the Court scheduled an Objection hearing to be held on June 2, 
2008 to discuss the Findings as prepared by Glen's counsel and the Objections as 
raised by JoAnn's counsel. At the time of the objection hearing JoAnn and her 
attorney were unaware that the trial court had already entered a Decree of Divorce 
and that Glen was already making financial decisions and had no motivation to work 
on outstanding issues. 
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At the Objection hearing, Glen's counsel committed to prepare new findings 
and a new decree based upon the ruling of the court at the Objection hearing. After 
waiting six months for Glen's counsel to comply, JoAnn's counsel prepared finding 
and a decree (still unaware that the Decree had been signed seven months earlier) 
to which Glen's counsel objected. The Court entered the Finding and Decree 
prepared by JoAnn's counsel and the court labeled the documents as Amended 
Finding and Amended Decree. 
The Court ordered, among other things, the following: 
1) Neither party was awarded alimony from the other, either now or 
in the future; 
2) The parties were to exercise joint physical and joint legal custody; 
3) JoAnn was awarded two hundred and forty-three (243) overnights 
per year with the minor child and Glen was awarded one hundred and twenty-two 
(122) overnights per year; 
4) The parties were ordered by the court to follow Utah Code 
Section 30-3-35 regarding additional times that Glen should have parent-time with 
the minor child; 
5) The court ordered that Glen could have additional parent-time if 
the parties agreed; 
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6) JoAnn's needs in relation to her claim for alimony were calculated 
using her expenses of several years earlier and the court did not consider her needs 
for retirement income; 
7) The court did not assess Glen's specific needs relating to the 
claim that he pay alimony nor did the court address the standard of living of the 
parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of trial the parties had been separated for a little less than three 
years. The parties marital relationship at the time of trial was going on twenty-seven 
years (R@ 2). At the time of the filing of the divorce JoAnn had raised concerns 
regarding Glen's ability to parent and JoAnn had requested that only supervised 
parent time be allowed (R@ 2). 
A custody evaluator was appointed by the court to assist the parties in 
determining the best interest of the minor child. Since this was a high conflict matter, 
the evaluator, Dr. Valerie Hale, appeared at trial and gave testimony as to her 
recommendation relating to custody (R@682 Page 21). There was no written 
recommendation prepared by Dr. Hale and the court recognized at trial that there 
were statutory requirements that the court was under relating to its decision and 
determination regarding custody (R@682 page 35). 
The court adopted the recommendation of Dr. Hale and ordered a joint 
physical and legal custody parenting arrangement. No parenting plan was submitted 
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by either party. The court also made numerous other orders relating to "additional 
time" that Glen was awarded with the minor child (R@560). 
The parties' incomes at the time of trial were very disproportionate with Glen's 
earnings being considerably greater than the income of JoAnn (R@ 549). 
Throughout the proceeding, JoAnn requested that she be awarded alimony 
from Glen based on her need for alimony and that the parties' standard of living 
dictated that alimony be awarded. The trial court determined that JoAnn did not 
have a need for alimony and that JoAnn's request that post-divorce savings 
investment or retirement monies be calculated in her needs for alimony was not to 
be considered (R@ 440). 
Further, the court ordered that in the future, neither party could be awarded 
alimony. The court ordered both parties to be fully liable and responsible for their 
own attorney fees and costs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court erred in its determination that the parties were to exercise 
joint physical and legal custody, and Glen was to receive "additional" overnights with 
the minor child that were not specifically set but could range between an additional 
thirty (30) to fifty (50) overnighters per year. No parenting plan had been submitted 
by the parties and the court was aware of JoAnn contesting the recommendation of 
the custody evaluator. 
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Both the court and the evaluator failed to specifically set forth sufficient 
findings for custody per the mandates of the statute or rules and no best interest 
determination was even mentioned or determined by the trial court. 
The district court further erred in its determination regarding alimony and the 
needs of both parties relating to the alimony claim which were not correctly 
addressed. The court's assertion that both parties were barred from alimony in the 
future was plain error. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR BY ENTERING CUSTODY ORDERS 
WITHOUT THE COURT CONDUCTING A BEST INTEREST EXAMINATION AS 
IS MANDATED IN UTAH CODE §30-3-10 THROUGH 30-3-10.2 AND BASED 
UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE CUSTODY EVALUATOR WHO DID 
NOT COMPLY WITH THE RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, RULE 4-
903(5)? 
In making a determination as to the future custody of a minor child, the trial 
court is under obligation to take into account certain statutory considerations as are 
specifically set forth in Utah Code §30-3-10 through §30-3-10.2. These factors 
include and are part of the "best interests of the child test" which must be analyzed 
by the trial court. 
In reviewing the amended finding of fact and conclusions of law and amended 
decree of divorce entered by the trial court on March 23,2009 there is no mention or 
findings entered of the specific criteria set forth in the statutes previously cited, nor is 
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there any mention of the court analyzing what is in the best interest of the minor 
child (R@ pages 647-663). 
It can be argued that the trial court relied on the custody evaluator's 
recommendation that the parties implement a joint physical and joint legal custody 
parenting arrangement with JoAnn having twenty (20) overnighters per month and 
Glen exercising ten (10) overnighters per month with the parties' minor child. The 
problem with that argument is that the evaluator did not submit a written report to the 
trial court, nor did the evaluator testify regarding each of the elements that are 
required in the statute already cited nor did the evaluator testify concerning the 
specific criteria as is mandated in the Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-903(5). 
Custody evaluators are under stringent rules that they must identify and explore 
every one of the criteria that is expressly set for in Rule 4-903(5). 
JoAnn, through her counsel, specifically put the trial court on notice that she 
did not agree with the recommendation of the court appointed custody evaluator, Dr. 
Valerie Hale (R@ 682, page 104). Dr. Hale testified at trial and specifically 
recommended to the court that the parties should exercise the custody arrangement 
previously identified. 
It can be argued that Dr. Hale included in her oral testimony all of the 
necessary factors that the trial court needed to consider to make a custody 
determination. Yet, a page by page review of her testimony (R@ 682, pages 36, 
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and 52-55) reveals that not all of the mandated criteria were taken into consideration 
and testified to. 
This is proof positive that not all required factors were considered by the 
evaluator and the argument is then made that since the trial court adopted the 
recommendation of the evaluator lock, stock, and barrel, the trial court failed to enter 
the necessary findings to make a proper custody decision. 
Even if it is determined that the statutory requirements were met to determine 
custody, there is no indication made whatsoever that the trial court made specific 
findings or stated what was in the best interest of the parties' minor child. Without 
the court having made the necessary findings by going through the criteria as is 
mandated by the statute, and there being no findings set forth regarding best 
interests, the entry by the Court of an order of custody must fail and be reversed. 
POINT 2 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR BY ENTERING FINDINGS AND 
ORDERING THE PARTIES TO EXERCISE JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY OF THE 
PARTIES' MINOR CHILD WITHOUT THE PARTIES SUBMITTING A 
PARENTING PLAN AND WITHOUT THE COURT DETERMINING THAT JOINT 
LEGAL CUSTODY WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR CHILD? 
In order for joint legal custody to be ordered by the trial court, several statutory 
provisions of the Utah Code must be complied with. These statutory directives are 
two- fold. First, the trial court must have received a parenting plan from one or both 
of the parties. Second, the trial court must have specifically made a determination 
that joint legal custody was in the best interest of the minor child (See Utah Code 
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§30-3-10 through 10.2). Further, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that this 
section of the code requires that a parenting plan be submitted before a court may 
order joint custody (Trubetzkov v. Trubetzkov. 2009 UT App 77, 205 P.3d 891). 
The trial court did commit reversible error by entering specific amended 
findings of fact (R@ page 648) and an amended decree of divorce (R@ page 659) 
stating that each of the parties were fit and proper parents to be awarded joint legal 
custody. The amended decree ordered joint legal custody without a parenting plan 
being provided by either party and the court did not make an inquiry or finding or a 
determination as to whether joint legal custody was in the best interest of the parties' 
minor child. 
It may be argued that the trial court relied upon the court appointed custody 
evaluator who did not prepare a report and who testified at trial that her opinion was 
that the parties exercise joint legal custody and recommended a specific time 
sharing split. This parent time recommendation however, should not be construed 
as a parenting plan and the file or record does not indicate that a parenting plan was 
offered by either party. Additionally, it should not be construed that there was 
compliance with a parenting plan mandate just because the trial court did put a 
mechanism in place for the parties to deal with situations where they did not agree 
on parenting decisions for the minor child and the child's therapist was to be involved 
in the decision making process. 
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Regardless, the trial court must conduct an inquiry as to what is in the best 
interest of the minor child in relation to a joint legal custody determination and the 
trial court must enter a specific finding to support its order of joint legal custody if the 
order is to comply with the statute. Further, even though the court identified the 
minimum parent time statute (Utah Code §30-3-35) in its amended decree, that 
should not be construed as a parenting plan. 
The trial court did not enter a parenting plan nor did the court identify that it 
had conducted a best interest of the child inquiry which is why the order must be 
reversed and why JoAnn should be awarded sole legal custody since the trial court 
already recognized her as the primary physical custodial parent. Prior to there being 
a requirement that a joint legal custody order must be accompanied with a parenting 
plan, the court of appeals had previously recognized that joint legal custody was not 
appropriate in situations where the parents were not in agreement (Thronson v. 
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428). 
POINT 3 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR BY ENTERING AMENDED 
FINDINGS AND AN AMENDED DECREE THAT WERE INCONSISTENT AND 
CREATED CONFUSION REGARDING PARENT TIME OF THE MINOR 
CHILD'S OVERNIGHTS WITH EACH PARENT? DOES THIS ISSUE 
INTERTWINE WITH THE PROBLEM OF THERE BEING NO JOINT LEGAL 
CUSTODY PARENTING PLAN SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES OR 
DEMANDED BY THE COURT? 
The amended findings of fact and conclusions of law state that there is to be 
parent time for each of the parties employing a 20/10 overnight split each month as 
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was recommended by the custody evaluator. Twenty (20) days each month JoAnn 
is to have parent time and ten (10) days each month Glen is to have parent time 
(R@ page 611). 
In its amended findings the trial court gave specific directions to the parties by 
breaking the parent time into four (4) separate divisions (A through D) which gave 
both parties directives on how the parent time was to be accomplished (R@ page 
611 and 612). A close examination of the amended findings and directives of the 
court reveal that the findings are inconsistent and they create confusion and they 
cannot be implemented as ordered, especially in light of the court's amended finding 
at paragraph 7. 
Subsection 5A, if implemented, would equate to 240 overnighters of the minor 
child with JoAnn and 120 overnighters of the minor child with Glen. Paragraph 7 of 
the amended findings and paragraph 4 of the amended decree state that the division 
of overnighters was to be a 243/122 overnight split between the parties. 
If literally applied, paragraph 5B would mandate that Glen have 52 
overnighters each year and Paragraph 5C would give Glen an additional 78 
overnighters each year. It is important to note that these overnighters do not seem 
to be tied to the times that the minor child is in school. School is referenced only as 
a guide. In other words, one would think that the overnighters should be viewed in 
the context of the full year and not just during the school year. 
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Therefore, paragraphs 5B and 5C would total 133 overnighters each year for 
Glen, which is different than the 240/120 split recommended by the evaluator and 
adopted by the trial court and the 243/122 split specifically ordered by the trial court 
at paragraph 7. 
However, the parent time division problem is further compounded by the 
court's amended finding in paragraph 5D which awards additional time consistent 
with Utah Code §30-3-35. It can be interpreted that the trial court meant to apply 
Section 30-3-35 to distinguish additional specific holiday parent time to be added to 
the court ordered overnight split. However, the trial court was silent on what it 
specifically meant regarding "additional parent time" and with the inconsistencies as 
set forth in the paragraphs A-D, one is really left to wonder what the trial court 
intended. 
Was the intent for the parties to apply the 20/10 overnight split as an overlay 
into the minimum guideline statute? The trial court did explain that the statute was to 
be used for "additional parent time". Hence, the trial court did enter conflicting 
findings by ordering the parties to employ the 20/10 overnight split, then told the 
parties that that equals a 243/122 overnight division and subsequently the parties 
were to implement 5B and 5C which would be equal to a 232/133 overnight split 
with additional parent time being possible by using the statute. This problem is 
further compounded since there was no parenting plan submitted by either party and 
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the court entered a joint legal custody order while at the same time rendering 
conflicting orders on parent time overnighters. 
Instead of receiving orders of clarity and specific directives from the trial court, 
the parties came away from trial with numerous conflicting orders. If it is argued that 
the difference in the number of the overnighters is insignificant, that this is harmless 
error, the implementation of "additional time" under Section 30-3-35 could result in 
an additional 30-50 overnight time period discrepancy. In fact, if it is believed that 
this 30-50 additional overnighter discrepancy is farfetched, it must be noted that the 
trial court wrongfully entered its original finding and decree (R@ pages 547 through 
564) which initially ordered 160 overnights with Glen (R@ pages 549 through 564) 
and 205 overnights with JoAnn which clearly shows the trial court itself was confused 
on what it was actually ordering. 
A close examination of the initial Findings and Decree signed by Judge Faust 
on May 21, 2008 were mailed to JoAnn's counsel on May 16, 2008 which was a 
Friday. JoAnn's counsel would have probably received the documents on Monday, 
May 19th or Tuesday, May 20th. Glen's counsel did not prepare the documents for 
JoAnn's counsel to approve as to form. Glen's counsel submitted the final 
documents to Judge Faust for signature literally one or two days from the time that 
JoAnn's counsel received the draft. Judge Faust wrongfully signed the documents 
and divorced the parties. JoAnn and her counsel did not know she was divorced 
until almost a year later. This gave Glen a huge advantage as he immediately 
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entered into large financial commitments and bought a new home, while JoAnn was 
left to think that nothing could be financially wrapped up until the divorce was 
finalized. Because of this, Glen had no incentive to finalize the case. 
This unawareness of finalization is evidenced by JoAnn's counsel preparing 
an Objection to the draft finding and draft order (R@ page 565 through 574) and 
submitting them to the Court on May 30, 2008. 
Certainly, in this high-conflict custody divorce action the trial court should have 
attempted to give very specific concrete orders on the time sharing that was to be 
carried out by the parties. Even though the wrongfully entered Findings and Decree 
were corrected and Amended Findings and an Amended Decree was later entered 
(R@ page 648 and 659) this still created huge problems between the parties 
regarding the number of overnighters the minor child was to spend with each parent. 
Further, this discrepancy can have a huge impact on the court's order of child 
support. 
It is important to note that JoAnn's position all along has been that she should 
be awarded sole physical and sole legal custody of the parties' minor child and that 
Glen should be awarded parent time consistent with the statute just as the parties 
exercised during their three year separation prior to trial. 
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POINT 4 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR IN ITS DETERMINATION THAT 
NEITHER PARTY WAS AWARDED ALIMONY FROM THE OTHER, EITHER 
NOW OR IN THE FUTURE? 
A literal interpretation of the order entered by the trial court in its amended 
decree of divorce is that both parties are forever barred from receiving alimony from 
one another. Specifically, the court stated in its amended decree of divorce at 
paragraph 20 (R@ page 625) that neither party was awarded alimony from the other, 
either now or in the future. Are there specific findings that were entered by the trial 
court to support this conclusion or amended decree that alimony is to be forever 
barred regardless of future changes in circumstances to either party. 
Utah Code section 30-3-5 sets forth Utah law in relation to alimony 
determinations. There is absolutely no provision in the code giving the trial court 
direction or latitude to bar future alimony. However, Utah law does specifically set 
forth how alimony can be modified after a determination has been made by the 
Court. The modification process, as set forth by statute, informs parties of the 
substance and process to make a change to an existing Court order. No mention is 
made of dealing with an adjudicated alimony order that forever bars an individual 
from attempting a modification. 
A comparison can be made by examining the alimony statute in relation to the 
exact language of when alimony may be curtailed. Specifically, the statute sets forth 
the several triggering events that can bring an end to an alimony order. One such 
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triggering event is that alimony can be terminated if the payor has been under an 
alimony obligation for as long as the Court has determined that the parties were 
married. An exception to this rule is that an adjudicated alimony award can be 
ordered longer than the parties marital relationship "only if the Court finds 
extenuating circumstances and the Court must detail what these extenuating 
circumstances are." 
The analogy can be made that the statute could also have included that for a 
Court to forever bar alimony to either party, the Court would similarly need to find 
that extenuating circumstances exist and that the Court would need to specifically 
identify those extenuating circumstances and enter findings supporting that 
conclusion. 
In this matter, the decision of the Court to forever bar future alimony is really a 
legal conclusion and* Order of the Court, and not a finding. There is absolutely 
nothing in the record that would lead the trial court to have a factual basis to forever 
bar alimony. Therefore, this is an abuse of discretion and the trial court's decision to 
award no alimony to JoAnn and to forever bar a claim should be reversed. 
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POINT 5 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR IN ITS DETERMINATIONS THAT 
JOANN WAS TO RECEIVE NO ALIMONY FROM GLEN BECAUSE SHE 
HAD NO NEED AND BECAUSE GLEN'S ABILITY TO PAY HAD NOT BEEN 
CALCULATED? 
Many of the findings of the Court's amended findings of fact are really 
conclusions of law and JoAnn contends that the trial court was deficient in making 
adequate findings to support its conclusions. 
Regarding JoAnn's need for alimony, the trial court's conclusions (even 
though set forth in the Amended Findings) relied upon JoAnn's affidavit and financial 
declaration submitted approximately two and a half years prior to trial (R@ pages 
103 through 109). 
JoAnn's counsel had offered proposed exhibits 29 and 30 that were received 
by the trial court and admitted into evidence as illustrative of JoAnn's trial testimony 
regarding her claimed monthly needs supporting her claim for alimony (R@ pages 
343 and 345; page 344 was inadvertently submitted between these two pages). 
In JoAnn's trial testimony, on direct examination from her attorney, Exhibit 29 
was discussed at length (R@ 682, pages 128-146). This exhibit reveals that 
JoAnn's needs as claimed at trial were $4,488.05 per month. On cross examination, 
Glen's counsel asked JoAnn some questions about Exhibit 29 (R@ pages 152 
through 175). After covering Exhibit 29, Glen's counsel contrasted JoAnn's monthly 
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expenses she had claimed approximately two and a half years earlier in an affidavit 
and financial declaration submitted to the Court (R@ 682, page 103 through 109). 
Glen's counsel then had Exhibit 47 marked and asked JoAnn questions 
regarding her old financial declaration (Record @ 682 pages 176 through 189). The 
record shows on the trial court generated exhibit listing (R@ page 437 and 438) that 
Glen only offered two exhibits at trial and the transcript reflects that there were two 
charts used. It appears that the two charts were a comparison with one chart being 
Exhibit 29 and one chart being Exhibit 47. The transcript also speaks of an Exhibit 
48 and an Exhibit 49 (R@ 682 pages 189 and 190), but there are no exhibits in the 
file showing charts or exhibits 47,48, or 49. It should be noted that the record does 
not designate that there were any of the original exhibits tabbed, labeled, and 
submitted. This shows great irregularities in the handling of the exhibits by the trial 
court which is compounded by there being no actual exhibit 47, 48, or 49 in the 
record nor any showing or production of the charts referenced and used by Glen. 
Regardless of these irregularities, it appears that the trial court used JoAnn's 
expenses that were several years old and ignored her current expenses outlined in 
Exhibit 29 which also included JoAnn's supporting documentation supplied at Exhibit 
30. 
There was absolutely no financial declaration submitted by Glen at trial and 
very limited testimony was elicited from Glen by JoAnn's counsel during trial. Again, 
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the trial court's only finding (conclusion) regarding Glen's income was that "the Court 
finds that Respondent would have the ability to pay some support" (R@ page 616). 
A similar situation existed in the case of Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 
843, wherein the trial court's determination regarding alimony was reversed and 
remanded when the Court simply stated the "the defendant has the ability to pay." 
The threshold issue that the trial court must examine in making an alimony 
determination is whether the statutory requirements necessary to make a claim for 
alimony as set forth in Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(a) have in fact been met. 
In the matter of Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 344 Utah Adv. 3 p 4, the 
Utah Court of Appeals articulated that in a parties' claim for alimony that the trial 
court must enter findings of Defendant's financial needs and that the trial court must 
make findings of Plaintiffs financial needs. Upon review, the Court of Appeals 
stated that even though each party testified about their monthly expenses, the trial 
court did not enter findings about the reasonableness of the expenses. Due to the 
failure of the trial court to conduct a proper examination, the case was remanded to 
the trial court. Additionally, the Court of Appeals went on to say that the trial court 
must enter findings on Plaintiffs (payor) financial needs and ability to pay support. 
In the case at hand, there was no financial declaration submitted by Glen so 
the trial court could not conduct an examination as to his (the payor's) financial 
needs or if Glen's financial needs were reasonable. The limited testimony that was 
received from Glen came in the last five minutes of trial as part of JoAnn's counsel's 
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re-direct examination of Glen (R@ pages 235 through 241). Here again, absolutely 
no financial declaration was submitted or produced by Glen. The testimony received 
was limited and vague at best, and there was no assessment by the trial court as to 
Glen's monthly expense. 
The limited findings entered by the trial court are really conclusions wherein 
the trial court entered at paragraph 30 of its amended findings, "the Court finds that 
the Respondent would have the ability to pay some support" (R@ page 616). This 
conclusion has absolutely no findings to support it, and therefore, is an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court. Further, the court entered no finding as to the 
reasonableness of this assertion that Respondent would have the ability to pay some 
support. Interestingly enough, the Utah Supreme Court enumerated in Martinez v. 
Martinez, 818 P.2d 538,542 (Utah 1991) that, "where the payor spouse's resources 
are adequate, alimony need not be limited to provide for only basic needs, but 
should also consider the recipient spouse's station in life." 
The Utah Court of Appeals also sets forth in Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 
877 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) that in determining alimony the trial court did not make 
sufficient findings on the financial needs of each of the parties. The Court stated that 
such findings are necessary in determining both the standard of living, and, in the 
case of the payor, the ability to pay. Finally, the Court in Breinholt gave additional 
direction by stating, "A true finding and determination of the ability to pay requires.. 
. the trial court to include an analysis of the payor's personal expenses . . . " 
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Additionally, the Utah Court of Appeals stated in the case of Bakanowski v. 
Bakanowski, 80 P.3d 153,2003 UT App 357, "usually the needs of the spouses are 
assessed in light of the standard of living they had during the marriage. Here, the 
trial court never determined wife's needs based on the parties historical standard of 
living." 
Further examination reveals that even though the trial court entered specific 
findings regarding JoAnn's income and expenses and needs (R@ page 615), the 
reasonableness of expenses and needs was never addressed by the trial court as is 
required and the Court accepted JoAnn's needs as of several years prior to trial. 
In the Utah Court of Appeals case of Compton v. Compton. 888 P.2d 686,255 
Utah Adv. 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) the Court stated that, "the needs of the spouses 
are determined by looking at the standard of living the parties established during the 
marriage. Living standards, and the needs those standards give rise to, vary from 
one marital arrangement to another, as do sources of income to meet those needs." 
POINT 6 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR BY DECLINING TO TAKE INTO 
ACCOUNT IN ITS ALIMONY DETERMINATION JOANN'S REQUEST TO 
HAVE GLEN PAY POST-DIVORCE SAVINGS AND/OR RETIREMENT MONIES 
TO HER? 
The trial court specifically set forth in its amended findings that, "the Court 
declines to take into the alimony determination the Petitioner's request to have the 
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Respondent pay her money for post divorce savings investment or retirement 
accounts for her" (R@ page 652). 
In the case of Kemp v. Kemp. 2001 UT App. 157, the Utah Court of Appeals 
dealt with this same issue. Since JoAnn's retirement paled in comparison to the 
retirement of Glen, and even after there was an equal sharing of the retirement 
proceeds, JoAnn would be in need of additional alimony funds so that she could 
keep pace with Glen since this was a long term marriage. The Court in Kemp held 
that although this is not ordinarily factored into an alimony determination, the Court 
could not say that this should never be taken into account as part of a needs 
analysis. In fact, the Court stated that if it could be shown that contributing to such 
accounts was a standard practice during the marriage and helped form the parties' 
standard of living, the trial court may be within its discretion to make these additional 
considerations. 
JoAnn rendered testimony (R@ 682 pages 117 through 122) that Glen was 
active in the parties' investment accounts and she also provided exhibits showing 
what investment accounts the parties held. Exhibits numbered 12 through 23 were 
submitted and admitted into evidence relating to all of the retirement accounts of the 
parties. Specifically, Glen's Qwest Pension account document (R@ page 305) 
showed his start date in 1978 (three years prior to the parties' marriage) and that it 
had a value of $327,840 (R@ 682 page 140 and R@ page 308). 
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The specific exhibits were proof positive of the standard practice of the parties' 
diligence in their investment accounts. This is precisely why JoAnn submitted her 
accounting and projections that it would take approximately an additional $700 per 
month (Exhibit 29, R@ page 345) for JoAnn to keep pace with the retirement 
standard of living that would be afforded to Glen. 
Therefore, the trial court erred not only in its determination that no alimony 
should be awarded, but also in its determination that the parties' post-divorce 
savings and retirement income should have not been allowed to be calculated as 
part of Petitioner's need for alimony. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner requests that the Amended Finding and 
Amended Decree previously entered be vacated and reversed. 
DATED this / / day of ^AMMF^/ 2010. 
David J Friel 
Attorney for Appellant 
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